Nobody is safe when the world’s security services are online looking for scandals
The Picadors of the Government and Bangerilärner welcomed – “We have him!”. Completely understandable; Tobias Thyberg is an experienced, internationally established diplomat who speaks Russian. Ergo: the perfect national security adviser. An expected counterpart to the predecessor Henrik Landerholm And his strangely repetitive carelessness with secretly stamped documents.
The new employer dedicated Thyberg to remove. Social media, private messages, everything. But it only took a few hours, then Lul photos showed up. Thyberg had to go – the photos were supposed to be the top of an iceberg of Compromatis. Now the staff of the government offices – their digital lives can be charged with international relations. Not in the least with Turkey.
There is planning President Erdoğan A new team package: ban to openly show that you are gay, trans or at. The country’s security service follows all the digital life of LGBTQI persons. Among other things, it led to the arrest of Yıldız takes -Journalist and editor -in -chief at Kaosgl, the equivalent of the country at the Swedish newspaper QX. Was Thyberg’s sexuality seen as an obstacle to the thriving, security policy exchange between Turkey and Sweden?
Swedish journalists are also imprisoned in Turkey. Was arrested at the end of March Joakim Medin. During the interrogation, the interrogator focused primarily on his social media. Revelation but through the Paywall locked articles on etc. in the world, in Kurdistan. President Erdoğan Hate Like it.
After the release, Medin asked in a DN interview:
– Do I have to stop – because the other states can make it irritated?
Now maybe Thinking that no, it would be incompatible with our democratic freedoms and rights. Here we can pick up Grindr and share NID photos of the dictator of Turkey. And write articles about him.
Only one thing annoys Ulf Kristersson More than compromising pick photos: when the honeymoon with Erdoğan is disturbed. The lively Turkish president was attracted to approve our NATO membership with an increased cooperation between the security services of the countries. It requires a constant exchange of information from the digital domain.
Journalist, politician, UD Official Doos does not matter. The delayed information can be shared with Turkey
Security services, including the Swedish, working with “Open Source Intelligence”, abbreviated osint. A acclaimed player is the Shadowdragon company. In the marketing material they describe how their software follows and archives the “target crumbs” everywhere on the internet. Everything can be seen: movements, opinions, relationships. All.
Based on ours Digital life, created some Shadowdragon “Life of Life”. Our digital life creates patterns. Patterns show habits and weaknesses. It offers opportunities to influence people. This applies to both national security advisers and Kurdish foxes and dissidents. And journalists.
For Erdoğan, free journalists are equated with terrorists. And journalists are by no means protected against Osint -Mapping. They have never been. Not even in Sweden.
In 2011, the security committee was able to confirm: under decades Had registered Säpo Opinion One mass. Journalists had their own column. Their articles were cut and collected, their habits and movement patterns were mapped. Materials were shared with American CIA.
But when the work of the Security Commission had to be investigated, the documents about the journalists had disappeared. They were destroyed. “Accidentally,” was said.
One goal with Osint – formerly like now – is that we know it is going on. It is supposed to keep us on the carpet. Since 2022, Swedish journalists have been at risk if they root in something that can influence national security. Information that the Turkish security service, for example, influences how Säpo focuses on Shadowdragon-like tools and secret data reading.
Sweden and Turkey have an agreement from 2022. It is explicitly stated that the security services of the countries must share information information. They must independently decide which goals are interesting. Such as the Kurdish dissident and local politician Shiyar Ali In Gävle. Like Joakim Medin.
OSINT information can provide a basis for prosecution on, for example, “unauthorized position with a secret task”. The criminal value gives the police the right to install spy programs in the digital units of the suspect. Journalist, politician, UD Official Doos does not matter. The reading information can be shared with Turkey. But only the knowledge that may be intercepted creates self -censorship. What the point itself can be.
During the interrogation, received Joakim Medin see a list of other Swedish journalists who have dismantled the Turkish regime. Given Säpo’s history of opinion mapping, we unfortunately have to ask ourselves: his information information about Swedish journalists with Turkey’s Security Service?
Because it looks, which Karin Pettersson Written on these pages, such as “that the democratic barriers seem to have released during the SODA process”.
A new committee is needed. Preferably now, before the traces are destroyed. “Accidentally”. Again.
The art of destroying art
31:26
